The idea of deducing legal rulings in Islamic law, or ijtihād, as well as the qualifications of the person who practices ijtihād, known as the mujtahid, has been a complex issue among Muslim ʿulamāʾ for centuries. Many Muslim ʿulamāʾ and Western scholars have maintained that the gate of ijtihād was closed. The title of mujtahid was therefore impossible to attain. The Moroccan intellectual al-Khamlīshī maintains that the strenuous conditions put forth by some of the Sunni jurists to qualify an individual to become a mujtahid actually contributed to the demise of ijtihād. These qualifications, according to al-Khamlīshī, were proven to be unachievable and stood as myriad obstacles in creating new generations to reform the old Islamic fiqh. This essay shows that, despite the extremely strenuous set of qualifications, through the writings of al-Khamlīshī, Moroccan women penetrated men's domain in Islamic family law, breaking the long-standing monopoly men held therein. 
Introduction
The idea of deducing legal rulings in Islamic law, or ijtihād, as well as the qualifications of the person who practices ijtihād, known as the mujtahid, has been a complex issue among Muslim ʿulamāʾ for centuries. Many Muslim ʿulamāʾ and Western scholars have maintained that the gate of ijtihād was closed after the formation of the Islamic schools of law (madhāhib). The title of mujtahid was therefore impossible to attain.
1 Aḥmad al-Khamlīshī, a Moroccan intellectual, maintains that the strenuous conditions put forth by some of the Sunni jurists to qualify an individual to become a mujtahid actually contributed to the demise of ijtihād. These qualifications, according to al-Khamlīshī, were proven to be unachievable and stood as myriad obstacles in creating new generations to reform the old Islamic substantive law (fiqh). This essay shows that, despite the extremely strenuous set of qualifications set in place for an individual to become a legislator (mujtahid), through the writings of al-Khamlīshī, Moroccan women penetrated men's domain in Islamic family law, breaking the long-standing monopoly men held therein. Most importantly, for the first time Moroccan women were publicly practicing ijtihād-a legal process that was once not only considered the realm of men exclusively, but was also seen as impossible to attain by anyone after the establishment of the Sunni Islamic schools of law in the tenth century.
Aḥmad al-Khamlīshī is one of the most prominent Moroccan scholars who has written extensively on the Moroccan Personal Status Law (Mudawwanat al-Usra) and the rights of women in Islamic substantive law. 2 Al-Khamlīshī authored a dozen books on Islamic law and the Moroccan Mudawwana. He was born in a small village in the Bedouin region of al-Ḥusayma in Northern Morocco in 1935. 3 Al-Khamlīshī was influenced by his father, a religious man and a 1 A mujtahid is an individual engaged in the process of deducing legal rulings (ijtihād In criticizing Islamic substantive law, Khamlīshī argues for reforming some of the outdated Islamic rulings using the method of ijtihād, where ijtihād takes into consideration social and economic factors of the time. 8 He is of the opinion that while some Islamic rulings are founded on certain written evidence-from the Qurʾān and the Sunna (conduct) of the Prophet-other rulings were based on the ijtihād of the jurists. 9 The latter type of ruling, according to al-Khamlīshī, could be reformed if it was discovered that the rulings failed to execute the objectives of Sharīʿa (maqāṣid al-sharīʿa) due to the change in time, custom, tradition, or the region's political and economic systems. 10 Al-Khamlīshī goes on to state that Sharīʿa was revealed to protect the rights of the individual and to maintain these rights without transgressing those of others, according to the Qurʾanic injunction, Q. 16: 90, "Allah commands justice, the doing of good, and liberality to kith and kin, and He forbids all shameful deeds, and injustice and rebellion."
11 Therefore, if the Islamic ruling does not achieve the objectives of Sharīʿa, according to al-Khamlīshī, it should be ignored even if jurists reached consensus (ijmāʿ) in the matter. 12 Al-Khamlīshī argues that fiqh students of today believe that ijtihād was limited to the four madhāhib and ended by the death of the eponyms of these madhāhib. 13 This belief was due to the opinion of the majority of the ʿulamāʾ, who decided that the gate of ijtihād is closed, and that the only madhhab that should be practiced in Morocco is the Mālikī, from which no one should deviate.
14 Further, al-Khamlīshī maintains that these ʿulamāʾ and their students believe that only the absolute mujtahid (al-mujtahid al-muṭlaq) may exercise ijtihād, however, they believe that these mujtahids do not exist at the present time. 15 Al-Khamlīshī concludes that Moroccan society is left with judges who are imitators of past jurists. 16 Some of these judges, according to alKhamlīshī, cherish imitation (taqlīd) and consider it a sacred tradition. Al 21 Of these scholars, al-Khamlīshī was one of the first to argue for women's place in this new collective ijtihad, calling for an elected body of experts composed of both men and women.
In May 2013, I had the privilege of conducting an interview with al-Khamlīshī. I asked his opinion on the state of fiqh, ijtihād and the role of women in the Moroccan Mudawwana, and alKhamlīshī explained his belief that the lack of women's participation in legislation, and lack of freedom in marriage, divorce, and other legal issues stemmed from the current state of Islamic fiqh and ʿulamāʾ. Al-Khamlīshī stated that today, ijtihād among Muslims is in a debilitated state. 22 He stresses that for centuries ijtihād has always been an individual endeavor. This individual endeavor according to al-Khamlīshī, cannot deduce general rulings to govern hundreds of millions of people throughout the world in general matters, nor in matters of Islamic law. This individual ijtihād produced many negative rulings which became obstacles in the lives of people in general and in the lives of women in particular. Al-Khamlīshī attributes these obstacles to many elements. He felt that a number of obstacles were placed deliberately by experts in Islamic legal theory (usūl al-fiqh) who put forth impossible terms under which an individual could qualify as a mujtahid. 23 AlKhamlīshī maintains that these experts believe that the mujtahid is one who interprets the eternal divine law to the masses. 24 According to al-Khamlīshī, other experts maintain that the mujtahid Al-Khamlīshī states that social issues differ from one century to another and from one region to another, even between Muslim states. To say that one individual is able to even be aware of all of these customs, let alone understand them all with respect to divine law (Sharīʿa) is a dangerous conclusion. Secondly, as a result of the reason described above, al-Khamlīshī believes that by stating that the mujtahid interprets the divine law, the mujtahid's opinion thus becomes absolute and unable to be challenged. 28 This leaves opinions deduced in the early Islamic centuries (between the seventh and tenth centuries) to become primary sources for debates in the twentyfirst century. Thirdly, due to the definition of a mujtahid as the only one who may interprets the divine law, the mujtahid is therefore able to deduce a ruling on any specific or general legal issue.
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More importantly, al-Khamlīshī argues that a ruling deduced by a mujtahid, whether the ruling concerns permitting or forbidding an action, is considered divine ruling (ḥukm ilāhī), and not merely a singular interpretation of the divine message, for instance. 30 As a result, the followers of the mujtahid held on to these opinions, considering them part of the Divine law (Sharīʿa). 31 With time, and after the formation of the madhāhib, by the end of the tenth century, people started to consider these madhāhib to be part of the divine law, according to al-Khamlīshī. 32 Al-Khamlīshī says that this blind belief in the madhāhib resulted in freezing the process of ijtihād and the gate of ijtihād. 33 He says that despite the change in customs and traditions over the past ten centuries, fiqh has not changed. 34 Instead people held on tightly to the old personal opinions of jurists and considered them among the eternal part of Sharīʿa.
35 "That is why we see many Muslims today claiming that Muslim states are not applying Sharīʿa and instead use new laws that are foreign to Islam and are imported from the West."
36 These laws are considered by many to be a threat to Islam and Sharīʿa. 37 Al-Khamlīshī's response to these complicated issues is to move away from the old ijtihād and the stagnation of fiqh. He also suggests a new type of ijtihād, which he calls "collective ijtihād" 27 Al-Qaraḍāwī, al-Fiqh al-Islāmī, 41. 28 Al-Khamlīshī, Jumūd, 62-64. 29 An interview conducted in May 2013. See also al-Khamlīshī, Jumūd, 6-7. 30 Al-Khamlīshī, Jumūd, 59. 31 Ibid., 1-90. 32 Ibid., 7. 33 An interview conducted in May 2013. 34 Ibid. 35 See also al-Khamlīshī, al-Ijtihād, 12-18. 36 An interview conducted in May 2013. 37 Ibid.
(al-ijtihād al-jamāʿī). 38 Al-Khamlīshī maintains that "the local society has the exclusive right to decide on which of the past rulings may be considered law. This may be done through institutions appointed by the local society or elected committee members." 39 He strongly recommends that the old restrictions on the qualifications of the mujtahid be eliminated. 40 The mujtahid, according to al-Khamlīshī, must be an expert in certain fields or an intellectual from within the local Islamic civil society. 41 In this collective ijtihād, says al-Khamlīshī, men and women experts in Islamic legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh), as well as experts in law, science and other fields such as medical and scientific fields are to be included. 42 Al-Khamlīshī's suggestion to include men and women experts on social and legal issues from outside the ʿulamāʾ in an effort to hear from all aspects of Muslims' society rather than keeping legal matters solely in the hands of the ʿulamāʾ. Thus al-Khamlīshī's ultimate aim was to break the monopoly of religious jurists over Islamic family law.
Al-Khamlīshī criticizes the ʿulamāʾ for holding on to the old fiqh while customs have changed dramatically from one place to another through more than ten centuries. He also blames the stringent and strict qualifications of the mujtahid on the eponym of the Shāfiʿī madhhab, Muḥammad b. Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī (d. 820). 43 According to al-Khamlīshī, al-Shāfiʿī stipulated that a mujtahid must possess the following qualifications, … [t]he knowledge of the Qurʾān and Sunna of the Prophet. The mujtahid must know which legal issues Muslims reached consensus (ijmāʿ) over and which issues they disagreed over (ikhtilāf). The mujtahid must be aware of the opinions of previous predecessors (salaf). He must be able to practice legal analogical deduction based on the reveled texts. He must also possess knowledge of the commands of the Qurʾān, its prescribed duties and ethical discipline, its abrogating and abrogated, its general and its particular rulings, and must be able to interpret the ambiguous verses. He must possess full knowledge of the Arabic language. 44 Al-Khamlīshī emphasizes that, due to the strenuous conditions made by al-Shāfiʿī, it was almost impossible for anyone to become a mujtahid and, instead, these conditions were responsible for producing imitators (muqallidūn) instead of genuine mujtahids. 45 Al-Khamlīshī asserts that, due to the changes that occurred in every society throughout the centuries, there must be renewal and reform to the old rulings. To him, this must be conducted according to the universal Qurʾanic law which states, "who (conducts) their affairs by mutual Consultation." 46 Al-Khamlīshī interprets this verse to mean that any ijtihād must be a collective type of ijtihād. In addition, according to al-Khamlīshī this type of ijtihād must be conducted continuously throughout the ages and in every region using the consensus of the Muslim 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid. community as a guide only and not a source of law. 47 He is of the opinion that there must be consultation with men and women experts as well as common people so as to deduce new rulings that are both pragmatic and, at the same time, able to resolve the issues of the day. 48 He also maintains that, while rulings in rituals (ʿibādāt) may differ from one jurist to another and from one madhhab to another, transactions (muʿāmalāt) may not be based on different opinions. 49 To him, there must be one law within the state that everyone can respect and obey. 50 Contrary to the opinions of other Arab Muslim intellectuals like al-Qaraḍāwī, who calls on Muslims to practice ijtihād only on issues without clear evidence, and only if Muslim jurists did not reach consensus (ijmāʿ) on these issues, al-Khamlīshī is of the opinion that ijtihād may be practiced for all issues of transaction, regardless of rulings previously reached by a consensus of jurists. 51 Therefore, he calls for new type of ijtihād so as to eliminate the ʿulamāʾs monopoly over fiqh and many transactions which harm the individual Muslim. Commenting on the role of the faqīh al-Khamlīshī questions his role by asking the question, What qualifies the faqīh to make a ruling regarding the age of marriage? Marriage laws require certain experts: lawyers, sociologists, and medical experts who need to be involved in making such decisions. A faqīh's opinion is only his opinion and must not be considered a law. The faqīh is nothing but a spiritual advisor (wāʿiẓ) and not a lawmaker. His opinion is one among many individual opinions, but never a law. 52 Therefore, al-Khamlīshī limits the role of jurists and considers their role to be that of a spiritual advisor rather than a peer of the legislators. He also restricts the legal rulings of the past jurists and considers these rulings to be mere opinions only and not part of the state's law. Al-Khamlīshī was not the first jurist to criticize Islamic fiqh and call for a new type of ijtihād. Contemporary Egyptian scholar al-Qaraḍāwī also followed in Riḍā's footsteps by calling for a new collective type of ijtihad formed of Muslim 'ulamāʾ while retaining the individual ijtihad as a parallel practice. 53 
Al-Khamlīshī on the Issue of Consensus (Ijmāʿ)
Consensus between Muslim scholars, though, has been something of a thorny issue for centuries. While we do not know the exact date that the consensus was reached, it is safe to say that the term was readily used by the eighth century. 54 As a general rule, consensus is applied to legal rulings that are mentioned in either the Qurʾān or Sunna, but are ambiguous or are otherwise not mentioned in the religious texts at all. Consensus is defined as the agreement of Muslim jurists (mujtahids) after the death of Prophet Muḥammad at a certain generation over a legal religious ruling deduced by jurists, or mujtahids.
55
During the twentieth-century a number of Muslim scholars raised questions concerning the authority of jurist consensus. Rashīd Riḍā, Muhammad Iqbal, al-Qaraḍāwī, and Fazlur Rahman were among the first Muslim scholars to levee criticism against the ancient method of consensus, calling for reformation of this outdated legal source. While Qaraḍāwī called for the establishment of a body of jurists and learned men of Islamic law, Riḍā and Iqbal argued that this elected body should also include legislatures with expertise in professions from outside the ʿulamāʾ. 56 However, a number of scholars have raised arguments in defense of the traditional authority of jurist consensus. For example, Fazlur Rahman considers consensus to be a versatile and necessary obstacle in Islamic law, contending that "ijmāʿ was regarded as absolutely authoritative" in its ability to establish law in the past, present, and future, 57 while Fazlur Rahman describes consensus as "the most potent factor in expressing and shaping the complex of belief and practice of the Muslims." 58 Al-Khamlīshī is also critical of the consensus (ijmāʿ) of jurists as a source of law. This consensus, according to al-Khamlīshī, while started in the eighth century C.E., could not be generalized as a source of law to all Muslims living throughout the world in different centuries. 59 
